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Abstract 
This article shortly summarizes basic theoretic approaches to tax burden and competition. The level 
and structure of tax burden is often discussed. In economic theory there are two basic opinions of level 
of tax burden and approaches to tax burden and competition and its impact on capital flows, economic 
activity and tax base. The first opinion prefers tax competition and „tax game“ because of positive 
effects on public expenditure, reducing of noneffective activities. The second opinion highlights the 
impact of tax competition in a negative way and prefers tax harmonization and puts stress on negative 
influence of capital mobility on capital tax rates and level on public expenditure. The present tax 
policy of the EU prefers revenue from indirect taxes (e.g. VAT and excise taxes), value of indirect 
taxes has continuously increased since 2001. Development of revenue from direct taxes has been 
fluctuating. On the other hand, the value of revenue from quasi taxes, mainly from social 
contributions, has a steady development in the countries of the European Union and it only decreases 
very slowly.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Every state - in order to fulfill its basic functions - must concentrate financial means in the form of 
public revenues. With growing globalization and internationalization, the level of tax burden is also 
discussed, as well as what is more profitable – keeping tax competition or tax harmonization. 
Although there are various opinions on taxes and level of tax burden, tax revenues usually remain the 
most significant income of public budgets. To put it in a simplified way, in the field of taxes we 
evaluate positively everything that makes it easy for free movement of goods, services, persons and 
capital within the single internal market as well as those things that correspond to principles of optimal 
taxation. The goal of the article is  shortly summarize basic theoretic approaches to tax burden and 
competition. 
 
2. Economic Theory and Tax Competition  
 
In economic theory there are two basic opinions of level of tax burden and approaches to tax 
competition, namely: 
• positive—putting an emphasis on so-called tax game; 
                                                 
1 This paper ensued thanks to the support of the grants – IGS SU 13/2009 and GAČR 402/08/0067. 
• negative—claiming that tax competition is actually harmful because decrease in tax revenues 
leads to providing public estates lower than the socially optimal level2.  
Followers of the first trend  - like Tiebout (1956, 416-424) - claim that tax competition is an optimal 
conception for organization of tax systems and leads to increase in wealth of all individuals in the 
society as it has positive effects on economic growth of individual countries, on more effective 
allocation of resources, on increasing efficiency of government activities and public expenditures and 
more effective providing of public estates and services. Positive evaluation of tax competition is 
mainly connected to more effective use of public resources and limiting non-productive activities, 
such as rent-seeking that are linked with the decision-making in the public sector. The stream starting 
with Tiebout theorem claims that competition enlarged by mobile households (or mobile companies) 
increases wealth of the society and thus, it is effective. Tax competition lies in the idea that 
government must have taxes low enough in order to attract sufficient number of citizens (or 
companies) but at the same time to provide sufficiency of public estates3, otherwise citizens use the 
choice of “voting with the feet” and move to an area that is more convenient for them.  
On the contrary, according to Stiglitz (1997), there are many reasons to be skeptical of this hypothesis. 
The main reason lies in his limited fiscal competition between units, because their number is limited in 
each division, and other authors also argue that in reality is "voting with the feet" difficult, since there 
are language barriers, administrative, family ties, etc. It is also necessary to mention the fact that the 
collected taxes (property, local, income and sales taxes) make distorsion effects, which can together 
with externalities lead to inefficiencies of allocation decisions at local level. 
Tiebout´s  hypothesis further elaborated Richter and Wellisch (1996, 73-93), when extended 
model of so-called mobile companies, which may behave similarly and also can "vote with their feet“. 
From this perspective, the concept of tax competition is positive and there is no reason to change it.  
On the other hand the representatives of the second trend - such as Oates (1973, 188-191) - 
claim that tax competition is basically harmful as the decrease of tax revenues leads to providing 
public estates lower than the socially optimal level. This approach mainly examines the impact of 
capital mobility on the level and structure of tax rates. The authors emphasize negative impact of 
capital mobility on tax rates of capital and level of public expenditures. 
Also Grifith and Klemm (2004) confirm that tax competition may lead to a "race to the 
bottom" and the lack of provision of public goods and services from the state - the result is the 
sacrifice of welfare state, and illustrate their argument using the example of countries such as France, 
Germany and Sweden, which are due to existing tax competition forced in recent years to reduce the 
scope of the "welfare state". 
More generally, the question of tax competition between governments and its impact 
conceived as a question of size of the state of the economy, the size of the different levels of power, to 
the extent desired redistribution processes. These two opposing views concerning the issues of tax 
competition between different degrees of economic integration, including integration in the European 
Union. Oates points out that the result of tax competition may be a tendency towards ever-lower 
efficiency provision of local public goods. Reduced if the local government taxes to attract mobile 
capital, public expenditures below the level where the marginal social benefits of these programs equal 
marginal costs. This can occur especially in programs that do not directly benefit the local business 
climate. Oates concluded that such conduct is inefficient governments, is based on the argument that 
no government eventually fails to win this fight competitive advantage (principle of prisoner's 
dilemma). Result of tax competition, therefore, is that all communities are worse off than if the 
political leaders used the normal maximization rule (the marginal benefits equal marginal costs). 
Other sources indicate that competition among governments may lead to the fact that the 
government stop providing certain public goods. As points Wilson (1999, 269-304), concept of 
"harmful" tax competition to attract investment was later applied to labor and environmental 
                                                 
2 For details see Szarowská (2009, 38-46). 
3 One of the reasons should be mechanism of decision of a voter, taxpayer and citizen of a certain region (town 
or village) according to their real preferences towards public estates on the one hand, and according to their will 
to pay taxes (local) on the other hand. Tiebout´s hypothesis assumes competitiveness and competition between 
communities when finding citizens´ preferences. 
  
standards, reducing social security and competition in indirect taxes on cross-border consumer . 
Oates´s concept of harmful tax competition was supported by a number of models that describe the 
consequences of behavior no cooperating regional governments. The success of any single 
government in attracting the tax base in the form of new residents and businesses leads to erosion of 
the tax base in other regions. The resulting negative fiscal externalities are reflected in particular in 
export tax when the government taxed income non-residents, or erosion of the tax base, thus moving 
the actual economic activity in tax-favorable sites, respectively transfer declaration profits. 
The opinions and concerns of insufficient amount of public expenditures may be opposed with 
data stated in Table 1. Even though there has been tax competition not only in Europe and there could 
be pressure on decrease of expenditures for the reason of insufficient amount of public revenues, total 
expenditures of the public sector have not decreased, on the contrary—since 1870 they have 
noticeably increased. 
 
Table 1 Growth of General Government Expenditure in % of GDP (1870 – 2007) 
  1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 1990 1996 2007 
Austria 10.5 17 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 38.6 51.6 49.7 
France 12.6 17 27.6 29 34.6 46.1 49.8 55 53 
Germany 10 14.8 25 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 49.1 44.3 
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32 31.3 35.9 36.5 
Norway 5.9 9.3 16 11.8 29.9 43.8 54.9 49.2 41 
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31 60.1 59.1 64.2 53.8 
UK 9.4 12.7 26.2 30 32.2 43 39.9 43 44.6 
USA 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27 31.4 32.8 32.4 37.4 
Average 8.76 12.13 18.41 23.39 30.04 44.05 43.94 47.55 45.04 
Source: OECD data and Tanzi, V., Schuknecht, L. (2000) 
 
New member states are often criticized for their “tax-friendly policies” which is usually 
proven by lower rates as well as by total revenues mainly from taxation of companies´ profits. 
However, Kubátová (2008) opposes that motivation for changes in tax rates in these countries is not to 
get competition advantage or to adapt to surrounding countries, but the effort to “fill” public budgets. 
Based on the above mentioned theories we may ask whether tax decrease (which is usually a result of 
tax competition effect) really always means decrease of tax collection.  
 
Figure 1 Average corporate tax rates and revenues in EU-15 (1980−2005) 
 
Source: Ganghof, S., Genschel, P. (2007, p. 6)  
 
The Figure 1 shows relation between amount of average corporate tax and revenues of state 
budget in the countries of the EU-15 in the period from 1980 to 2005, proves that it is not the case. It 
is apparent that in spite of significant decrease of rates there was no decrease of tax revenue, but quite 
the contrary—it increased, and this development may be interpreted as application of concept of Laffer 
curve4  in practice. 
It is not possible to unambiguously confirm or to disprove the usefulness or harmfulness of tax 
competition, either theoretically or empirically. However, it should be emphasized that tax 
competition is not deliberately or artificially created but it is a result of unsuccessful harmonization 
negotiations and it results from various types of tax systems of individual countries.  
 
3. Tax Burden and its Measuring  
 
Tax is an obligatory amount determined by law in advance, by which a part of nominal income 
is taken away from a tax subject on the non-refundable principle. 
The question is what rates or values should be the tax burden comparison based on. The 
easiest choice is comparison of statutory tax rates as a statutory tax rate is the legally imposed rate. 
This comparison is often used because of its simplicity and good availability of data. It is commonly 
used for comparing incomes and excise taxes. However, we must pay attention to the fact that 
statutory tax rates may include not only so-called nominal tax rates but also temporary or permanent 
complementary rates or allowances and moreover, in a great number of states taxes are collected on 
more levels of governments. Thus their organization may vary in the countries.  Therefore, statutory 
tax rates may not be an objective indicator for the purposes of mutual international comparison.  
 
3.1 Implicit Tax Rates 
 
An appropriate standard for comparison of effective taxation seems to be implicit rates, which 
are tax rates that consider not only size of statutory tax rates but also other aspects of tax systems 
determining total amount of effectively paid taxes (for example differently constructed tax base). 
Implicit tax rates are calculated in order to provide better information on the tax burden on an 
economic activity. 
Implicit tax rate (ITR) = T / Y x 100 [%]                                        (1) 
Where T is tax duty and Y is gross income from which tax is counted. 
It is obvious that no tax rate will be consistent with ITR in case when a tax allowance is 
included in tax construction (non-taxable part of tax base or deductible item) or tax relief. Comparison 
of statutory and implicit tax rates shows tax incentives provided by authorities in individual countries; 
comparison of implicit tax rates across individual states provides indications whether there are 
significantly dissimilar tax approaches to companies with the same characteristics but located in 
various countries.  Such data may prove whether great differences of statutory tax rates do not only 
hide minor differences in implicit taxation, as countries with high statutory tax rates may decrease size 
of tax base or soften tax enforceability.  
Eurostat has used implicit tax rates for evaluation of structure of a tax system since 1995. In 
this way, we may express impact of taxes on economic activities according to their functions (work, 
capital, consumption).  
 
3.1.1 Labour Implicit Tax Rate 
 
                                                 
4 Laffer curve expresses dependence of tax revenue on rate of taxation (or tax rate). It proves that maximum rate 
of taxation does not mean maximum revenue of public budgets. When increasing rate of taxation, tax revenue 
only increases up to a certain point (Laffer point), and when increasing the rate of taxation further, tax revenue 
begins to fall. That is, if rate of taxation (tax rates) is too high, tax subjects are discouraged from increase in 
performance, work and savings, or they move their addresses outside the given state, which means decrease of 
tax revenue in the end. 
 
Labour implicit tax rate represents a proportion of taxes and statutory insurance (paid from 
labour incomes by employers as well as employees) to total labour costs (total volume of 
compensations paid to employees on the territory of the given state including possible taxes from 
earnings excluding tax revenues from social transfers).  
ITR labour =  Taxes on labour / (compensation of employees + wage bill and payroll taxes)  (2) 
 
Figure 2 Labour Implicit Tax Rate in % GDP (2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
 
The highest labour tax burden is in Sweden, followed by Italy and Belgium. Generally, labour 
tax burden is steady in the European Union, and higher burden may be found especially in the 
countries of the original EU-15. According to the data of 2006, the Czech Republic is the seventh most 
expensive country of the whole European Union. 
 
3.1.2 Capital Implicit Tax Rate 
 
Tax environment is a significant factor for investors when deciding about allocation of their 
investments. Despite harmonization efforts of the European Union there is a hot tax competition in the 
area of these taxes regarding to high mobility of capital. The existing situation is caused not only by 
fiscal reasons but also by efforts to attract foreign capital by favorable tax regime. Capital implicit tax 
rate is calculated as proportion of collection of taxes from revenues of savings and investments of 
households and companies to volume of worldwide revenues from capital and enterprise of domestic 
tax residents that is liable to domestic taxation. When comparing values and development of capital 
implicit tax rates there are great differences between member states of the EU. In general terms, the 
(overall) ITR on capital can be defined as follows: 
ITR capital = Taxes on capital income / potentially taxable capital income             (3) 
 
Figure 3 Capital Implicit Tax Rate  in % GDP (2006)  
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat   
  
At one end there is Spain and Ireland where there was significant increase of capital implicit 
tax rate in the monitored period (by 18.5 per cent and 16.8 per cent respectively), at the other end there 
is Estonia and Slovakia where there was a great decrease in connection to introduction of equal tax (by 
17.2 per cent in both countries). Estonia is by far a country with the lowest capital implicit tax rate (8.4 
per cent), on the other side of the scale there is Ireland (42.5 per cent) and France (41.5 per cent). 
 
3.1.3 Consumption Implicit Tax Rate 
 
Taxes on consumption are defined as taxes levied on final consumption goods. Consumption 
implicit tax rate is calculated as proportion between total revenues from taxes from consumption (for 
example in the Czech Republic mainly VAT and excise taxes) and total final costs of households of 
consumption on the territory of the given state. 
ITR consumption =  Taxes on consumption / final consumption expenditure of households  (4) 
Figure 4 Consumption Implicit Tax Rate  in % GDP (2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
 
In 2006 the consumption implicit tax rate in the Czech Republic was 21.2 per cent, which is 
almost one per cent below the average value of the EU-27 (22.1 per cent), value of the rate in Poland 
was still one per cent below the rate in the Czech Republic. In the implicit consumption tax burden 
there are not such great differences as it applies for other types of taxation. One of the reasons is 
probably fact that consumption is easier to be taxed, even if the payment moral is lower.  
 
3.1.4 Implicit Tax Rates in the EU – Summary 
 
The last graph summarizes what current trends there are in the tax policy of the European 
Union. It is obvious from the graph that in the EU the labour implicit tax rate is higher than capital and 
consumption tax rates. Labour is taxed above average especially because it is not much mobile, 
compared to other production factors. The capital implicit tax rate does not fall, but it tends to rise in 
the long term in spite of decreasing nominal rates. The reason for this is expansion of tax base and 
partially the impact of fight against tax evasions. The lowest is the consumption implicit taxation when 
the reasons may be social reasons as well as the fact that consumption is easier to be taxed and 
possibility of tax evasion is lower than in case of more mobile tax bases - labour and capital.  
Figure 5 Implicit tax rates in EU in % GDP (1995 –2007)  
 
Note: calculation used arithmetic average data 
Source: The author´s own compilation based on data from Eurostat    
 
3.2 Tax Quota 
 As already mentioned, international comparison of actual taxes does not say much with regard 
to different construction of taxes in individual countries. Level of tax rate is only one of the variables. 
Resulting values substantially affect differently constructed tax bases, from which the tax is 
calculated, as well as systems of exceptions and deductible items that vary in every country. As 
recommends Kubátová (2005, 142-50) for international comparison of tax burden we may use a tax 
quota . This is a macroeconomic indicator that is calculated as “proportion of tax and duty revenue and 
to GDP” in current prices. 
Tax quota = tax revenues / GDP * 100   [%]                     (5) 
 
It actually represents a proportion of gross domestic product that is redistributed by means of 
public budgets. As it uses data of really collected tax revenues to GDP, it provides information about 
value of total effective taxation in the given country. Depending on the “extent” of numerator (i.e. 
“extent” of public revenues considered), there is a simple and a compound (sometimes called overall) 
tax quota. Simple tax quota includes only those incomes of public budgets that are really labeled as 
taxes. With regard to the fact that tax revenues (quasi taxes) are in fact also incomes from the 
obligatory payments to social welfare, contributions to state unemployment policy and obligatory 
payments to health insurance system, the relevant indicator for international comparison is the 
compound tax quota that also includes these incomes. Compound tax quota (CTQ) is calculated as 
“proportion of revenue from tax, duty and payments to health insurance and social welfare systems to 
GDP” in current prices. 
Compound tax quota = tax revenues + quasi taxes / GDP * 100  [%]       (6) 
 
As it results from the formula, basic factors affecting value of tax quota is the amount of gross 
domestic product and volume of taxes collected5.  
Total effective burden is regularly monitored by Eurostat and published in the form of tax 
quota. 
 
3.3 Tax Quota and Its Development 
 
Total effective burden is regularly monitored by Eurostat and published in the form of tax 
quota. In 2006 compound tax quota in the European Union reached its average value of 37.1 per cent, 
which is higher by twelve per cent than in the US or Japan. Similar development may have been 
observed since the 1970s when there was an increase in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, 
and the main reason for this was mainly the need to cover higher and higher public expenditures.  
Figure 6 Compound tax quota in the EU in % GDP ( in 2006) 
 
Source: The author´s own compilation according to Eurostat data   
 
This problem of expanding state activity is described by so-called Wagner´s law6. After the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact7 were adopted, there were changes in fiscal 
                                                 
5 For tax quota in details see Szarowská (2008, 168-77).  
6 After Adolf Wagner, a German economist of the 19th century. When incomes per capita increase in the 
economy, relative size of public sector also grows. The base of this statement was empirical. Wagner observed 
growth of public sector in many European countries, the United States and Japan in the 19th century. Forces 
policies of some countries related to the effort to accept Euro, and subsequently there was decrease of 
public expenditures, which was indirectly projected also by decrease of compound tax quota.  
What is important is not only amount of the indicator observed but value and ratio of 
individual components as well. According to the structure of tax quota, i.e. according to the fact which 
taxes bring the highest incomes into the public budgets, member states of the European Union may be 
divided into three groups. The following table shows that in sixteen countries the main source of 
public revenues are indirect taxes, i.e. taxation of consumption. In six countries the highest revenues 
come from direct taxes (mainly personal and corporate incomes taxes) and in five countries the basic 
source of public budgets are payments for social welfare8. 
 
Table 2 Division of EU countries according to the main tax resource in 2006 
Main Source of Tax Revenues 
Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes Social Contributions 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus,  
Lithuania, Latvia,  Hungary, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Austria, Romania, Greece, Slovenia, 
Spain 
Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland,  Luxembourg, 
Sweden,  United Kingdom 
Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Slovakia 
Source: The author´s compilation according to Eurostat data  
 
Figure 7 displays the average shares of revenues raised from direct and indirect taxes and 
social contributions across the European Union. It also confirms a standard, generally used economic 
rule which prefers indirect taxes9 to direct ones. As points Široký (2009) high income taxes may 
discourage employees from earning more and force companies to take their profits into countries with 
the lowest tax rates. Therefore, many economists claim that the best taxes for the economy are those 
from consumption. Their level may threaten groups with low incomes but this may be compensated by 
special social benefits. Moreover, they are transparent10. 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
causing these movements in proportion of public expenditures to GNP were explained in connection to political 
and economic factors. Wagner explained the existence of services of public sector, such as legal services, police 
and banking, by increasing complexity of manufacturing relations. Banking, provided by state banks, is to 
connect those who offer surplus funds with those who have the best opportunities to invest. Growth of public 
expenditures on education, recreation and culture, health and welfare was explained by Wagner with regard to 
their income elasticity of demand. For Wagner these services represented superior or income-elastic needs. 
Therefore, together with growth of real incomes in the economy (i.e. with increase of GNP) there is an increase 
in public expenditures on these services more than proportionally, which is explained by an increasing 
proportion of government expenditures to GNP. 
7 The Stability and Growth Pact is an agreement between members of the Eurozone regarding coordination of 
their budget policies so as not to threaten stability of Euro or to increase inflation in the Eurozone in case of 
possible high deficits of state budgets. The agreement partly applies to states of the European Union that have 
not accepted Euro as its currency. 
8 When we compare development in the Czech Republic with OECD countries we find, that social insurance 
creates a decisive share of tax revenues in almost all OECD countries. OECD publication explains the increasing 
share (from 18 per cent in 1965 to 26 per cent in 2003) mainly by pressure on increase of social transfers related 
to increasing unemployment, aging population and greater government expenses on health service. 
9 Indirect taxes are value added tax, excise tax, duty and other indirect taxes. 
10 Direct taxes are imposed on a concrete subject that may not transfer this tax on somebody else, e.g. income 
tax. Indirect taxes are also imposed on a concrete subject, but may be transferred on another one. 
Figure 7 Average EU revenue by major type of tax (in 2006) 
 
Source: The author´s compilation based on Eurostat data   
 
However, individual Member States have very different structures according to the type of tax. 
New Member States tend to rely to a smaller extent on direct taxation. Direct taxes only account for 
around 20 % of total revenues in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia while they represent more than 60 
% in Denmark. The share of indirect taxes varies from 30 % in the Czech Republic and Belgium to 
56.5 % in Bulgaria. Social contributions only bring 2 % of total revenues in Denmark, but 44 % in the 
Czech Republic11. Figure 8 shows development and changes in structure of compound tax quota in 
Member States between years 1995 and 2006. 
 
Figure 8 Components of compound tax quota in the EU in % GDP 
 
Source: The author´s compilation based on Eurostat data   
  
Although taxes are cross-cutting tool connected to many sectors of public life and government 
policy (i.e. social policy, environmental policy, education, health), the main task is still to ensure 
sufficient revenues for financing public goods and services. Each government must choose the own 
tax strategy and create efficient  system of taxes (so called tax mix). Globalization and other socio - 
economic changes are reflected in changes in the preference of the structure of tax revenues. Next 
Figure 9 decomposes the change in the overall tax burden into (positive or negative) changes of its 
                                                 
11 For details see Taxation trends in the European Union (2008) 
three major components. The black line shows the change in the overall tax to GDP for all the 
countries. The figure highlights that, in the period under consideration, Member States only shifted 
taxation from one type of taxes to another. Examples of changes in the tax mix are the Czech Republic 
and Poland, which shifted the burden of taxation from taxes to social contributions, and France, 
Slovenia, Latvia, and the Netherlands, which did the opposite. Bulgaria and Romania, too, shifted 
taxation in a clear way towards indirect taxation, but this is not visible in the figure owing to the lack 
of data for 1995. In more recent years, there has been a lively discussion about the merits of a shift 
towards indirect taxes, and such a measure was taken, for instance, in Germany in 2007, when part of 
a VAT increase was used to finance a cut in social security contributions.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Evolution by major type of taxes 1995-2006, differences in % of GDP  
 
Source: Taxation Trends in the European Union (2008) 
 
The present tax policy of the EU prefers revenue from indirect taxes (e.g. VAT and excise 
taxes), value of indirect taxes has continuously increased since 2001.  Development of revenue from 
direct taxes has been  fluctuating. On the other hand, the value of revenue from quasi taxes, mainly 
from social welfare payments, has a steady  development in the countries of the European Union and it 
only decreases very slowly.  
 
4. Conclusions  
 
With growing globalization and internationalization, the level of tax burden is often discussed. 
In economic theory there are two basic opinions of level of tax burden and approaches to tax burden 
and competition and its impact on capital flows, economic activity and tax base. The first opinion 
prefers tax competition and „tax game“ because of positive effects on public expenditure, reducing of 
noneffective activities. The second opinion  highlights the impact of tax competition in a negative way 
and prefers tax harmonization and puts stress on negative influence of capital mobility on capital tax 
rates and level on public expenditure.  
For comparison of tax burden, the easiest way is to use statutory tax rates but the result may be 
rather inaccurate. More convenient way of comparison is comparing implicit tax rates that consider not 
only size of statutory tax rates but also other aspects of tax systems determining total amount of 
effectively paid taxes. Eurostat has used implicit tax rates for evaluation of structure of a tax system 
since 1995. In this way, we may express impact of taxes on economic activities according to their 
functions (work, capital, consumption). Published data show current trends in the tax policy of the 
European Union. It is obvious that in the EU the labour implicit tax rate is higher than capital and 
consumption tax rates. Labour is taxed above average especially because it is not much mobile, 
compared to other production factors. The capital implicit tax rate does not fall, but it tends to rise in 
the long term in spite of decreasing nominal rates. The reason for this is expansion of tax base and 
partially the impact of fight against tax evasions. The lowest is the consumption implicit taxation when 
the reasons may be social reasons as well as the fact that consumption is easier to be taxed and 
possibility of tax evasion is lower than in case of more mobile tax bases - labour and capital.  
The complex indicator providing an international comparison of tax burden is a tax quota that 
compares total implicit taxation in individual countries by measuring a proportion of effectively 
collected taxes on gross domestic product. Total effective burden is also regularly monitored and 
published by Eurostat. Research has proven that value of tax quota falls in time and indirect taxes 
prevail over the direct ones. In sixteen countries of the EU main resources of public revenues are 
nowadays indirect taxes, i.e. taxation of consumption. In six countries the greatest revenues come from 
direct taxes (especially personal and corporate income taxes) and in five countries the basic source of 
public budgets are payments for social welfare. In the process of decreasing taxes, thus increasing 
competitive advantages over the neighboring states, the most active countries are those in the Middle 
and East Europe. Both trends mentioned above appear in the member state of the European Union to 
various extent. When assessing countries according to statistical data, we find great differences not 
only in tax quota but especially in its structure and construction of individual taxes. 
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